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Children, according to the old saying, should be seen and not heard. Until rather 
recently, much the same was true about Canadian judges. However extensive and 
unchallengeable their authority was within the courtroom, outside of it they were 
silent -  virtually muzzled by the traditional conceptions of the judicial role, without 
a legitimate forum in which to express themselves or a public persona with which 
to speak. When Justice Berger of British Columbia tested the boundaries of these 
expectations by speaking out on behalf of Native peoples and women against the 
1981 Constitutional Agreement, he discovered at the hands of the Canadian Judicial 
Council just how firm the boundaries were.1 Until recently, the reigning tradition 
of judicial decision-making, emphasizing a mechanical process tightly bound to 
authoritative precedent, also severely constrained the way judges could 
communicate even within the courtroom.
Clearly, however, this concept of the judicial role no longer applies. As Ian 
Greene has noted, we now expect judges to exercise a degree of leadership in our 
society, and this leadership takes various forms which stretch traditional 
boundaries.2 Inside the courtroom, they can make use of academic books, articles 
and commission reports to an extent that would have raised judicial eyebrows just 
a few decades ago, allowing them to deal with controversial issues in ways that 
transcend literal and mechanical legal analysis. Compared with the explanatory 
style of a few decades ago, many appeal courts seem to be writing their decisions 
in a way which genuinely attempts (not always successfully) to be more accessible 
to a broader public — less technical, less cryptic, and less jargon-ridden. Outside 
the courtroom, judges can comment on current issues in a way that not even Chief 
Justices would once have dared. The most recent and striking example of this is 
perhaps Justice Cory publicly countering the suggestions of the Reform Party of 
Canada about possible changes to the Young Offenders Act. These are important 
changes in the relationship between judges and the rest of society.
In these remarks, I want to discuss a third aspect of judicial leadership that 
falls somewhere between the writing of more accessible reasons for judgment and 
the making of public speeches on controversial topics. This is the phenomenon 
of judicial participation in legal scholarship, primarily through contributions to the
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university and professional legal journals.3 At first glance, this seems 
unobjectionable, a natural and logical outgrowth of the “mainstream” judicial role 
of expounding and explaining the law. To some extent, the logical and intellectual 
process is much the same whether it occurs within the context of the judicial 
resolution of a specific case or is couched in more general terms within the pages 
of an academic journal. It raises none of the questions of a public or semi-public 
speech on, for instance, a policy issue currently or potentially before Parliament. 
However, I would suggest that this practice raises some problematic questions in 
its own right.
To begin one requires some idea of the scope of the practice. Checking 
through the Canadian, English-language university and professional law reviews4 
over the last ten years,5 I was able to identify a total of forty-three articles 
(including the texts of fifteen addresses) by Canadian judges, twenty-seven of these 
by sitting or recently-retired members of the Supreme Court of Canada.6 This is 
far from an overwhelming presence -  the average journal of the thirteen I 
surveyed would carry one article by a judge every three and a half years and one 
by a Supreme Court judge every five years -  but neither is it negligible. By 
comparison, Australian judges loom far larger in the legal writing of that country. 
It is a rare issue of the Australian Bar Review that does not include at least one 
article by a sitting judge (usually Justice Kirby), and most of the state law journals 
typically include at least one article by a judge every year, although there are some 
(such as the Melbourne Law Review and the Monash University Law Review) where 
the practice is much less frequent.
To be sure, the articles by Canadian judges come in all shapes and sizes. 
Some (three examples) take the form of short pieces praising the contributions of 
recently retired members of the court or of distinguished law professors. Others
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(eight examples) are on what we might think of as “traditional” topics (like the 
Schumiatcher Annual Lecture Series on “Law as Literature”, or comments on legal 
education). Some (six examples) deal with statistical or procedural matters. 
However, others (such as the eight articles on the implications of the Charter) are 
organized around more substantial and controversial themes of current interest to 
the court, and still others (eleven examples) are more directly focused on case-law. 
The purest examples of this latter category are Justice MacGuigan’s discussion of 
a single specific case,7 and Justice Sopinka’s recent “case comment” on the Nelles 
case,8 although several of the pieces by Justice Wilson and Justice McLachlin on 
women and the criminal law are equally relevant. Since these are the articles that 
raise my issues in the most pointed and immediate way, the rest of this discussion 
will treat them as if they were more typical than they are.
Perhaps I could make my general point clearer by organizing it around a 
specific issue and, to avoid making my comments unnecessarily pointed or 
provocative, I will use an Australian example. It is generally expected that trial 
judges will provide not just a decision but also a set of reasons explaining that 
decision by explicitly resolving the relevant points of fact and law. The critical 
questions, of course, are how extensive and complete those reasons have to be, 
and against what sort of yardstick the higher courts will measure them. In 
Canada, the Supreme Court has recently declared expectations in this regard that 
are quite generous to trial judges.9 This decision would clearly have gone the 
other way in Australia, where the courts have always recognized a legal obligation 
for judges (especially when they are sitting without juries) to state clear and 
complete reasons for their decisions. Justice Michael Kirby, the President of the 
New South Wales Court of Appeal, has, on at least two occasions, written 
academic articles describing the Australian jurisprudence and expanding upon the 
principles and the conceptual logic that drive it.10
It seems to me that if I were a trial judge in Australia, particularly if I were 
a trial judge in New South Wales, I would have to take such articles very seriously.
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There may be a trial in which I would be inclined to write only the briefest of ex 
tempore reasons for judgment -  perhaps because it presents such a complex 
balancing of the probative value of evidence and the credibility of witnesses that 
it would be enormously time-consuming to write anything but brief reasons, or 
because it is one of those hard cases that make bad law because highly unusual 
circumstances justify hedging on some meritorious general rule. In such a case, 
I would have to consider not only the decisions of the Australian High Court and 
the decisions of my own Court of Appeal, as is the usual practice, but also extra­
judicial comments on the issue made by a member of my Court of Appeal.
What if my reading of the case-law differs subtly but significantly from the 
President’s, or if I can accept some of his generalized rules on writing decisions 
but have serious doubts about others? I am in no position to argue my view of the 
matter as I cannot intervene before the appeal court. My brief decision will have 
to stand on its laconic lonesome as it would look more than a little strange if my 
trial judgment contained less in the way of “reasons” than it does “reasons for not 
giving reasons”.
If the legal rules emerged literally from the pages of a High Court panel 
decision, then I would (in all but the most unusual of circumstances, and maybe 
even then) simply have to live with them whether I liked them or not -  but rules 
derived from an article do not have that status. If I ignore them, I am possibly 
subjecting the winners of the case to the bother and the delay of an appeal, the 
result of which may be a new trial. Even if the end result is the same as that of 
the original trial, this is no small inconvenience. Worse, if the appeal is allowed, 
the Appeal Court will say that it is because the trial judge (who happens to be me) 
did not do the job properly, and this will be a major professional embarrassment 
to me, both in the eyes of my fellow judges and in terms of my own self-opinion. 
Perhaps I should respond by writing my own article for the Australian Bar Review, 
although such a public challenge to my own Chief Justice may appear more than 
a little cheeky, and this strategy would still do me no good at all in the immediate 
case.
This example involves a senior appeal court judge discussing decisions of the 
High Court. However, there are other aspects of the problem that would be 
better illustrated by assuming that the judge writing the articles himself is a 
member of the High Court, so, for the remainder of this article, I will award him 
this hypothetical elevation. Suppose that the decisions he is discussing are not only 
those of his own court, and not even only those of panels of which he was a 
member, but decisions that he had delivered himself on behalf of the Court. In 
this case, the journal article might take the form of a brief, more focused 
restatement of the decision — an edited version highlighting some aspects and 
leaving others aside, and perhaps fitting it into a logical, developing sequence with 
other cases. It might be thoughts along the line of “perhaps we did not make
ourselves completely clear” — providing further elaboration or clarification in 
response to academic analysis or subsequent lower court case-law. Finally, it 
might be something like “we never considered X, but if we had done so, we would 
have said such and such.”
Each of these raises the same logical problem, although with escalating 
degrees of seriousness. Decisions, like statutes, do not apply or interpret 
themselves and even a light editing can give any serious writing quite a different 
spin. This is simply because different people reading the same paragraph can have 
quite different impressions of what is important and what is tangential, and of 
what is implied and what is excluded. Editing often involves making this choice 
explicit, making it for the reader rather than letting the reader make it for herself. 
Terrell has suggested that we should think of judicial decisions as having not just 
a location on some notional multi-dimensional grid, but also a direction, in the 
sense that they presume, and implicitly recommend to others, a particular line of 
development from the existing case-law.11 Changing the “spin” by editing a 
decision can, therefore, be just as critical as changing its location -  to edit is to 
amend, whether it is done by the same person or by another.
Where a decision has already been partially misunderstood, the revisions 
become more significant, and therefore more problematic.12 R. v. Askov is 
probably the most vivid recent example of a case where the Supreme Court either 
made a mistake or was misunderstood.13 Justice Cory took the unusual step of 
using an address to a professional meeting in Cambridge, England, to restate the 
Supreme Court’s intentions. This restatement was essentially adopted by the 
Court in R. v. Morin.14 For my purposes, assume that Justice Cory had written 
an article rather than having given a speech. What would the status of that article 
have been during the interval between Askov and Morinl Would a trial judge have 
been obliged to follow the Appeal Court’s interpretation of the critical paragraph 
in Askov or would she have been justified in ignoring the most recent Court of 
Appeal decisions to follow Cory? To make the point differently, we have some 
idea to whom the Supreme Court is speaking and with what effect when it hands 
down its decision -  but to whom is Cory speaking when he suggests in a speech 
or an article that he has been misunderstood, and what does he expect them to do 
about it?
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Extrapolating the meaning of an actual decision into new territory is the most 
critical of the three examples. In one sense, it is useful for those interpreting the 
decision to have access to the organized and systematic second thoughts of the 
person who wrote the decision. In another sense, however, that judge’s opinion 
on such future extension is no more valuable than anybody else’s. As academics 
often suggest without apology, it is indeed possible that were Shakespeare to hop 
on a time machine and visit our century, he would flunk a course on 
Shakespearian literature. The case for denying our writing justice a privileged 
position is much stronger than the case for marking Shakespeare down for his lack 
of expository and analytical imagination because even the writing judge on the 
panel does not “own” the decision. The process of appellate decision-making is 
collegial and deliberative.15 Having heard the arguments of counsel, the panel 
goes into a conference room to discuss how the case should be handled. On the 
basis of a straw vote, people begin drafting the majority decision and reasons (and 
sometimes dissenting opinions as well) to which other judges respond by 
suggesting alternate wording or reasoning, with the revised draft again being 
circulated. The result can be additional conferences in which the initial voting 
blocs firm up, grow or fragment, sometimes turning the initial dissent into the 
majority opinion and vice versa.16 If the panel had indeed been considering “X” 
then the discussions, the drafting, and the suggested revisions would have been 
different, and there is no way of telling to what extent (or even whether) any 
particular judge’s initial reaction would have prevailed without this issue actually 
having been discussed. All the writing judge can tell us in an article discussing 
“X” is what a first draft might have looked like, but this is quite different from 
suggesting what the final result would have been.
As we move away from the judge who wrote all or some of the decisions being 
discussed, the problems become more serious. Judges are individuals, even on 
unanimous panels or within the bloc that has joined to support a majority decision, 
and it is often the case that they have accepted appellate appointment precisely 
because it offers the chance to contribute to the development of the law.17 It 
frequently makes a good deal of difference which judge writes the decision because 
no two judges will follow exactly the same logical track, use exactly the same 
examples or metaphors, or cite exactly the same set of antecedent cases -  even 
when the outcome is already agreed upon, the other members of the panel can 
suggest changes to make the reasons more comfortable to them, and the final 
draft is to some extent a collaborative product. This is why studies of the U.S.
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Supreme Court suggest that there are frequent hard fought battles over the 
assignment of opinions and track the ebb and flow of voting coalitions and 
individual reputations in these terms;18 indeed, recent studies suggest that the 
same maneuvering and calculations even enter the decision of who will write the 
dissent when there is more than one judge in opposition.19
I would suggest that this problem is just as acute for concurring as it is for 
dissenting or separately concurring judges. This is because the decision to join or 
to write does not simply measure initial (or even final) disagreement on outcome 
or reasons -  a wide range of additional factors can go into the decision not to 
write separately as well.20 A judge may want the Court to speak with a united 
voice, or the decision to be made by a majority rather than a plurality, or she may 
support an individual or a bloc of colleagues in the hope that this bread cast upon 
the waters will return manifold.21 If I were a judge writing about the decision of 
another judge on a case which included me on the panel, I suspect that even with 
the best of intentions my analysis of how she wrote the decision and what she 
meant by it would evolve into suggesting how I would have written the decision 
had the task fallen to me. These differences may not be massive, but it is unlikely 
that they will always be negligible, especially as the difference may be part of the 
reason why she was selected to write in the first place.
In this context, it is striking that the three judges who are the most prolific 
article writers rank among the judges who are least often called upon to deliver 
decisions for the Court.22 Seniority is undoubtedly part of the explanation for 
this, but the statement remains true even if we correct for seniority. That is, for 
the first five years, and again for the second five years, of their service on the 
Court, these individuals deliver the majority decision less frequently than the other 
judges in their first five and second five years of service. One logical consequence 
of this is a higher than average frequency of dissents and separate concurrences.
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Another is, arguably, the seeking of an alternate outlet for those ideas that 
majorities could not be persuaded to share and to endorse, possibly in the form 
of contributions to the academic literature. To put it perhaps more bluntly than 
it is fair to do, those judges who are delivering the largest number of the Court’s 
significant decisions are too busy to be writing articles for submission to academic 
journals, and they know that those decisions will have more impact than articles 
in any event.
Of course, the arguments that I have made here have to be qualified in 
significant ways. First, I am not suggesting that the conscious purpose of judges 
who publish in journals is to attempt end runs on their less academically inclined 
colleagues — although this effect can be significant even if the intent is lacking. 
Second, even now that the rules on citing academic books and articles have been 
significantly relaxed (cracked by William Lederman, shattered by Peter Hogg), 
judicial citations are still the preferred weapon in the explanatory arsenal of 
Canadian judges, so it is unlikely that journal articles are having a major impact 
or will do so in the foreseeable future. Third, the academic writing of Canadian 
judges is much more modest in volume, and much more inclined to report rather 
than to argue, than is the case in Australia or the United States.
Am I suggesting that judges should not submit writings to academic journals, 
or that the editors of those journals should as policy reject such submissions? 
Hardly — that would be a ten-ton solution to a one-pound problem and, in any 
event, my concern is less with the judges than with their audience. Since the swing 
in judicial appointments in recent years is toward more appeal court judges with 
academic backgrounds, these contributions can be expected to increase. My point 
is much more modest, namely, that both the judges who write and the scholars 
who read should remember that the gown is left behind in the table of contents. 
Even when writing about the doctrinal evolution of her own court, the judicial 
author has no automatic claim to any more insight or any more authority than 
anyone else venturing onto the territory, and wields no heavier a sword in the 
clash of opinions that follows. To be able to quote from Judge X’s journal article 
when Judge X herself is on the panel may or may not be an advantage, depending 
how Judge X’s colleagues feel on the issue and how the discussion in conference 
goes; in the end, it may not even get the vote of Judge X. Shorn of the undue 
weight that unreflective reaction might seem to assign it, the academic leadership 
of the judges of the Supreme Court of Canada and other courts is to be welcomed 
as part of the general shift from the invisible-outside-of-the-courtroom style that 
we are rapidly leaving behind us and as a useful element in the leadership which 
we expect from judges in the late twentieth century.
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